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CONVERTING COUNTRY-SPECIFIC ADVANTAGES INTO 
FIRM-SPECIFIC ADVANTAGES IN EMERGING MARKETS 
 
Abstract  
Scholars have suggested that the origins of firm-specific advantages (FSAs) are the 
local environment in which a firm is based. However the extant literature has not 
explained how to convert country-specific advantages (CSAs) in the local 
environment into FSAs. Drawing on the resource-based view of the firm, in this 
research we develop an overarching framework explaining how local firms in 
emerging markets first access CSAs, and then transform CSAs into unique FSAs. We 


















 In the past few decades local firms in emerging markets have not only 
survived a fierce battle against established multinational enterprises (MNEs) for home 
markets, they have also expanded internationally through exports and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) to become multinational enterprises in their own right. High profile 
examples include China’s Huawei in telecommunications equipment, India’s Tata 
Consultancy Services in information technology services, Brazil’s Embraer in 
regional jets, Russia’s Gazprom in energy, and Mexico’s Cemex in cement. This 
evidence suggests that local firms have developed unique firm-specific advantages 
(FSAs) compared to established MNEs (Ramamurti, 2009; Williamson & Yin, 2009; 
Williamson & Zeng, 2009; Zeng & Williamson, 2007). 
 However, compared with established MNEs, local firms in emerging markets 
tend to possess technology that is less cutting-edge (Lall, 1983; Wells, 1983), 
resources that are less sophisticated (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 2000; Dawar & Frost, 1999), 
and disadvantageous branding among potential clients (Bilkey & Nes, 1982). Faced 
with this conundrum, the research question in this study therefore asks how local 
firms in emerging markets developed their unique FSAs compared to established 
MNEs.  
 CSAs (country-specific advantages) and FSAs have long been studied in the 
literature (Dunning, 1980, 1988; Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Hymer, 1976; Rugman, 
1980; Rugman & Verbeke, 2003; Rugman, Verbeke, & Nguyen, 2011). CSAs are 
strengths or benefits specific to a country that result from its competitive environment, 
labour force, geographic location, government policies, etc. (Rugman & Collinson, 
2009). FSAs are strengths or benefits specific to a firm that a result of contributions 
that can be made by its personnel, technology, and equipment (Rugman & Collinson, 
2009). FSAs can be further categorized into location-bound (LB) FSAs and non-
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location-bound (NLB) FSAs (Rugman & Verbeke, 1992, 2003). The LB FSAs reflect 
strengths deployable and exploitable in a limited geographic area, such as a single 
country or a limited set of countries and region, but cannot be profitably exploited 
outside of this area, whether as an intermediate output or embodied in final products. 
In contrast, NLB FSAs represent company strengths that can easily be transferred 
across locations at low cost, deployed and profitably exploited, with only limited need 
for resource recombination. Drawing on the resource-based view of the firm, Rugman, 
Verbeke and Nguyen (2011) suggest that CSAs in a country can lead to new LB FSAs 
but also have the potential to be transformed into NLB FSAs. 
 In a similar line, Porter (1991) examines the issue of a dynamic theory of 
strategy and indicates CSAs are the origins of FSAs by reviewing and analysing the 
progress of the strategy field. He separates the theory of strategy into two dimensions: 
the cross-sectional problem and the longitudinal problem. The first investigates the 
causes of superior performance at a given period in time, which can be termed as the 
cross-sectional problem. The framework of five competitive forces (Porter, 1980) falls 
in this category, which aims to build a careful link between the underlying choices a 
firm makes in terms of its industry, positioning, and market outcomes. Although this 
framework has been explored, contributed to, and tested by many other researchers 
(McGahan & Porter, 1997; Porter, 1980, 1985; Rumelt, 1991; Schmalensee, 1985) it 
has not answered the question why particular firms were able to get into advantaged 
positions and sustain or fail to sustain them. The answer to this question needs 
understanding of the so called longitudinal problem. 
 Scholars have also made some headway in answering the longitudinal problem. 
One prominent theory is the resource-based view (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 
1986, 1991; Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984), which argues that the origins of 
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competitive advantage are the valuable resources that a firm possesses, including 
technological know-how, management skills, reputation and the like. The promise of 
the resource-based view for the strategy field is the effort to address the longitudinal 
problem, or the conditions that allow firms to achieve and sustain favourable 
competitive positions over time. However, it still leaves unanswered the question 
about the origins of competitive advantage, which is: how can valuable resources be 
obtained, created, and sustained? 
 Drawing on those arguments, Porter (1991) goes further back in the chain of 
causality and contends that the origins of competitive advantage are the environment 
within which a firm is based. As stated by Porter (1991: 96-110), “We observe 
striking concentrations of successful firms in a particular industry in particular 
locations, which suggests that something about these locations are fundamental to 
creating and sustaining advantage…Instead of solely within the firm, the true origin 
of competitive advantage may be the proximate or local environment in which a firm 
is based”. 
 However, the extant literature has not answered the question of how CSAs in 
the local environment can be converted into FSAs. In this research we attempt to 
contribute a parsimonious and yet complete framework of CSA-FSA conversion 
towards a dynamic theory of strategy. We conclude with the observation that, given 
its pivotal position between country-specific advantages and firm-specific advantages, 
the CSA-FSA conversion process is likely to be a particularly fruitful focus for 





THE CONCEPTS OF CSAS AND FSAS 
 As a starting point of understanding the concepts of CSAs and FSAs, we must 
go back to the theories developed by researchers in the area of FDI explaining 
international production and FDI (Dunning, 1980, 1988; Dunning & Lundan, 2008; 
Rugman, 1980, 1981; Rugman, 2010; Rugman et al., 2011). Dunning's eclectic or 
OLI paradigm explains that whether, and to what extent, a firm engages in FDI 
depends on three factors (Dunning, 1980, 1988). 
 The first is the ownership by the firm of assets or access to assets which its 
competitors or potential competitors do not possess. Such ownership-specific inputs 
may take the form of a legally protected right (such as patents, brand names, 
trademarks); or of a commercial monopoly (such as the acquisition of a particular raw 
material essential to the production of the product); or of exclusive control over 
particular market outlets; or they may arise from the size or technical characteristics 
of firms (such as economies of large-scale production and surplus entrepreneurial 
capacity).  
 The second is the interest and ability in the internalization of these assets, i.e. 
making use of them rather than selling or leasing them to others. The basic incentive 
of a firm to internalize its ownership endowments is to avoid market imperfections, 
which may arise wherever negotiation or transaction costs are high, wherever the 
economies of interdependent activities cannot be fully captured, and wherever 
information about the product or service being marketed is not readily available or is 
costly to acquire. It is argued that the common governance of geographically 
dispersed value-added activities within a single firm is comparatively more efficient 
and effective than governance by independent market actors or even by an equity joint 
venture where more than one firm is the residual claimant.  
 The third aspect is location-based factors that influence the profitability of 
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exploiting the firm's assets in a foreign country versus in the home country. These 
include not only Ricardian type endowments - natural resources, most kinds of labour, 
and proximity to markets, but also the legal and commercial environment in which the 
endowments are used, such as market structure and government legislation and 
policies. In classical and neoclassical trade theories, differences in the possession of 
these endowments between countries explain the willingness and the ability of 
enterprises to become international.  
 Rugman takes this approach further by combining the first two factors, 
ownership advantage and internalization advantage, into firm-specific advantage 
(FSA) and labelling the third factor country-specific advantage (CSA) in the 
FSA/CSA framework (Rugman, 1986; Rugman, 2010). However, the fit is not perfect. 
The main reason for misalignment is that Dunning's OLI model focuses upon outward 
FDI into host economies, whereas Rugman's matrix is for firm-level strategy covering 
MNE activity in both home and host countries (Rugman, 2010).  
 The original notions of the FSA/CSA concept can be traced further back to 
long before it was labelled as such. The underlying concept of CSAs developed more 
than 50 years ago, when national competitiveness at country level was the unit of 
analysis in IB research. In the pre-Hymer (1960) era, international economists 
dominated the field and focused on national competitiveness (i.e. CSAs) at the 
country level, using national statistics on trade and foreign investment. Their 
assumption is that differences in factor endowments across borders will lead to 
international transactions, whether transfers of capital or goods. 
 Hymer (1960) explains why a firm engages in international operations by 
shifting the focus from the country level to the firm level. He was the first to propose 
the concept of firm-specific advantages. Hymer's great insight is his recognition of the 
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MNE's possession of FSAs, required to offset the liability of foreignness (LOF) when 
operating abroad (Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 1995). FSAs are closely linked to the MNEs 
as the unit of analysis and more recently to the subsidiary of a MNE as a third major 
unit of analysis in IB research (Rugman et al., 2011).  
 Rugman and Verbeke (1992, 2001, 2003) have further argued that FSAs can 
be created anywhere in the MNE network, both in the parent company at home and in 
the foreign subsidiaries. FSAs can be location-bound or non-location-bound. The LB 
FSAs reflect strengths deployable and exploitable in a limited geographic area, such 
as a single country or a limited set of countries or region, but cannot be profitably 
exploited outside of this area, whether as an intermediate output (e.g., managerial 
skills, R&D knowledge) or embodied in final products. In contrast, NLB FSAs 
represent company strengths that can easily be transferred across locations at low cost, 
deployed and profitably exploited, with only limited need for resource recombination. 
Such NLB FSAs typically include the upstream patented technological knowledge, 
and the downstream brand names. This framework incorporates the thinking of 
Birkinshaw and Pedersen (2009) who align the resource-based view of the firm with 
the resources and capabilities developed and held in an MNE (Barney, 1991; Rugman 
et al., 2011; Wernerfelt, 1984).   
 
THE RESOURCE-BASED VIEW OF THE FIRM 
 The idea of looking at firms as a broader set of resources goes back to the 
seminal book The theory of the growth of the firm (Penrose, 1959), which discussed 
the role of resources in diversification. However the resource-based view received 
relatively little formal attention in the following several decades, until Wernerfelt’s 
(1984) conceptual article entitled “A Resource-Based View of the Firm”, which was 
13736 
 
selected as one of the most influential papers published in the Strategic Management 
Journal prior to 1990 (Wernerfelt, 1995). One major contribution of this article was to 
direct strategy scholars back toward resources as important antecedents of products 
and, ultimately, a firm’s performance (Priem & Butler, 2001).  
 The subsequent development of the resource-based view has focused on the 
characteristics of firm resources that can contribute to a sustainable competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Rumelt, 1984). Dierickx and Cool 
(1989) suggested that managers should recognise that a bundle of firm assets lie at the 
heart of their firm’s competitive position. Barney (1991) provides what is arguably 
the most detailed and formalised depiction of the resource-based perspective, 
suggesting that organisational resources that are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable 
and non-substitutable can yield sustained competitive advantage. Barney’s argument 
supplied the footing for many resource-based view studies, with subsequent work 
based on either his framework or an extension of it.  
 Barney (1991) notes that two assumptions are critical to the resource-based 
view of the firm: (1) resources are distributed heterogeneously across firms, and (2) 
these productive resources cannot be transferred from firm to firm without cost. These 
assumptions are the axioms of the resource-based view of the firm. Given the 
assumptions, Barney (1991) makes two fundamental arguments. First, resources that 
are both rare (i.e. not widely available) and valuable (i.e. contribute to firm efficiency) 
can lead to a competitive advantage. Secondly, resources which are neither easily 
replicable by competitors nor substitutable (i.e. when other resources cannot fulfil the 
same function), may lead to a long-term competitive advantage. From these core ideas, 
arguments have been advanced that firms can achieve sustainable competitive 
advantage from such resources as information technology (Mata, Fuerst, & Barney, 
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1995; Powell & Dent-Micallef, 1997), strategic planning (Michalisin, Smith, & Kline, 
1997; Powell, 1992b), organisational alignment (Powell, 1992a), human resources 
management (Lado & Wilson, 1994; Wright & McGahan, 1992), trust (Barney & 
Hansen, 1994), organisational culture (Fiol, 1991; Oliver, 1997), administrative skills 
(Powell, 1993), top management skills (Castanias & Helfat, 1991), and guanxi (Tsang, 
1998).  
 Following this stream of research in the resource-based view of the firm, we 
hope to find out whether CSAs in emerging markets can be rare, valuable, imperfectly 
imitable and non-substitutable resources which can lead to sustained FSAs. 
 
STRATEGIC CSAS IN EMERGING MARKETS ARE RARE, VALUABLE, 
IMPERFECTLY IMITABLE, AND NON-SUBSTITUTABLE RESOURCES 
 As a starting point, we suggest that CSAs are valuable resources because they 
are fundamental to creating and sustaining competitive advantage (Porter, 1991). Six 
broad attributes of the proximate environment form Porter’s "national diamond" 
(Porter, 1990), each of which can influence the competitive advantages a local firm 
creates:, , ‘demand conditions’, ‘factor conditions’, ‘related and supporting industries’, 
‘rivalries’, ‘the role of chance’, and ‘the role of government’. These will shape the 
information that firms have available to perceive opportunities, the pool of inputs, 
skills and knowledge they can draw on. The national diamond provides an effective 
and convenient way of classifying CSAs (Rugman & Collinson, 2009), and we will 
follow Porter’s classification for analytical purpose in this study. 
 Utilising this definition we next need to consider: what might make these 
potentially valuable CSAs rare, imperfectly imitable and non-substitutable (and hence 
“strategic”)? Of course, like internal firm resources, not all CSAs are rare and non-
substitutable resources which can lead to sustained competitive advantage. In what 
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follows, we show how at least a percentage (often a large percentage) of the CSAs in 
emerging markets, meet those criteria and hence can contribute to the competitive 
advantage of some firms (rather than being freely and equally available to all firms in 
that location). 
 First, consider CSAs associated with local demand conditions. In order to 
access these CSAs, an effective distribution network is generally essential because the 
distribution network not only acts as a channel to bring goods and services to 
consumers, but also an important conduit for collecting information and insight about 
buyer behaviour. In many mature economies the distribution network is relatively 
easy to access because the market for distribution services is generally open and well 
developed. In these markets, for example, distribution can often be secured by 
contracting with any number of reliable local distribution agencies on transparent 
terms. In this case, the distribution network will not be a rare resource. In emerging 
markets, however, market imperfections mean that the distribution network is often 
difficult to access. As Hennart (2009) has pointed out, it can be a difficult and lengthy 
process for MNEs to build a distribution network in an emerging market because local 
customers may have formed strong bonds with a small number of powerful local 
distributors. Access to these distributors may be restricted and the terms non-
transparent. Acquisition of these distributors may be blocked by host-country 
governments and, even where it is permitted, generally requires locally-specific, post-
integration management skills. Building an alternative distribution channel, 
meanwhile, will also require a deep knowledge of local context, strong relationships 
with a myriad of local stakeholders and other location-specific capabilities. In this 
case, access to distribution networks in emerging markets will vary among competing 




Another CSA associated with demand conditions in emerging economies, 
especially China and India, are their large and rapidly growing domestic markets. In 
order to take advantage of this CSA, however, firms must be able to identify 
customers and secure their business (Hennart, 2012). This requires understanding 
their specific needs and tastes and hence location-specific capabilities to access the 
potential CSA. Moreover, in many emerging economies  industries such as banking, 
telecommunications and car manufacture that are often considered as “nationally 
strategic” for development or security reasons, access to the market is often tightly 
controlled by national and local governments so that access depends on securing 
licences. The number of operating licenses is often very limited so that only those 
companies with the best relationships with the government or with superior 
negotiation skills attuned to local culture and norms are able to obtain them. These 
operating licenses are neither imitable nor substitutable. Again therefore, market 
access to those industries, and hence the potential CSAs associated with demand 
conditions, become a rare and strategic resource. 
 Second, in respect of local factor conditions, it has been widely assumed that 
factors such as abundant skilled but low-cost labour, are freely available to all entrants. 
In practice, however, accessing this labour pool requires capabilities for identifying, 
attracting, training and motivating suitable employees – capabilities that are often 
highly location-specific due to differences in local culture, career expectations, and 
institutions. 
Third, effective access to CSAs associated with related industries and 
suppliers can depend on a firm designing their products and value chain to be 
compatible with local capacity, locally-specific relationship management and shared 
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culture -- especially in emerging economies where intermediate markets remain 
imperfect and the environment is characterised by significant institutional voids 
(Khanna & Palepu, 1997). The benefits of scarce access to these supply-side CSAs 
can be very significant with local suppliers offering adequate quality at 30% to 40% 
lower prices (Dobson, 1993). 
 The fourth dimension of Porter’s diamond, rivalry, is the attribute of the 
Diamond model that is most equally available to all firms because once in the same 
business environment all might be expected to face similar competition. Even here, 
however, interpreting the strategies and the implication of competitive moves and 
signalling by players in a particular market requires capabilities in local insight and 
analysis and knowledge networks, especially in emerging economies where the 
availability of reliable data and disclosure requirements are more limited than in 
mature economies.  
 The fifth dimension, the role of chance, includes developments such as the 
political decisions by government and surges in regional demand (Rugman & 
Collinson, 2009). Again, local knowledge and capabilities for assessing the 
implications, along with the quality of its local relationships, as well as regional 
presence and experience may impact a firm’s differential ability to take advantage of 
CSA’s thrown up by chance. The effects are likely to be particularly important in 
emerging economies where volatility is high and political processes less than 
transparent. When the Chinese government announced in September 2013, that it 
would create the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone within which financial 
services, telecoms services, professional services, shipping, entertainment, and social 
(education and medical) services would be deregulated, for example, about three 
dozen firms soon secured permission to enter. Yet weeks later it was still unclear how 
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they applied, since the rules had not been made public (The Economist, 2013). Clearly 
accessing this potentially important new “CSA” depended on reputation, relationships 
and capabilities that not all firms enjoyed. 
 Finally, institutional conditions in emerging markets are often difficult 
compared to developed countries. However, some local firms are capable to turn these 
disadvantages into advantages when competing with MNEs at home. The capability to 
cope with difficult institutional conditions at home may be useful in other emerging 
markets that also have difficult conditions and therefore present similar problems 
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). Because only a limited number of firms can access 
and convert difficult institutional conditions into advantages, institutional conditions 
in emerging markets can be regarded as rare, imperfectly imitable and non-
substitutable resources.  
 In sum, there are good reason to expect that, rather than being freely and fully 
accessible by all firms, a significant percentage of CSAs in emerging markets 
“strategic” in the sense that they are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and 
substitutable resources because they can only be accessed with the help of locally-
specific capabilities, knowledge and relationships that are unequally distributed 
among different firms. The extant literature (e.g. Porter's national diamond, Dunning's 
OLI model, Rugman's FSA/CSA matrix), however, has not explained how strategic 
CSAs can be converted into new FSAs. This is the research question that we 
investigate in this study. In the next section, we will propose an overarching CSA-
FSA conversion framework. 
 
TOWARD A THEORY OF CONVERTING CSAS INTO FSAS 
 We have now explained that strategic CSAs in emerging markets are valuable 
resources which are fundamental to creating and sustaining competitive advantage. As 
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a starting point for converting FSAs from CSAs, firms must access strategic CSAs, as 
CSAs are external resources which exist in the business environment. Contrary to the 
implicit assumption of the OLI and internalisation theory, strategic CSAs in emerging 
markets are not equally available to all firms (Hennart 2009, 2012). In the following 
we will develop propositions to explain that some local firms in emerging markets are 
better able than established MNEs to access strategic CSAs because of their different 
competitive strategies, closer relationship with the government, and better local 
knowledge. Some local firms are also better at transforming those strategic CSAs into 
non-traditional FSAs because they have accessed complementary knowledge, focused 
on locally-appropriate innovation efforts, and achieved incentive alignment. Local 
firms may be endowed (at birth) with complementary capabilities of knowledge (e.g. 
from their founders) that help them access strategic CSAs and then transform them 
into new FSAs. Once the conversion cycle has started, more and more FSAs will be 
created by conversion from strategic CSAs. The conversion framework is shown in 
Figure 1, and we elaborate each proposition in more details as follows. 
 
Accessing CSAs 
 Competitive strategies. Clearly there will be considerable inter-group variation 
in the strategies adopted by individual firms among MNEs and local firms competing 
in any particular market. Despite this variance, however, we can expect the modal 
points of these distributions to differ in systematic ways. Extant literature points to the 
trade-offs between global integration and local responsiveness as a key driver of 
MNEs strategies (Prahalad & Doz, 1987). This is because the ability to balance the 
benefits of internalising the transfer and arbitrage of common resources and 
capabilities against the costs of poorer fit with local market requirements lies at the 
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core of MNEs competitive advantage (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 2002; Devinney, Midgley, 
& Venaik, 2000; Prahalad & Doz, 1987). The strategic choices MNEs make will 
therefore impact the extent to which they seek to leverage the CSAs in a local market.  
    At one extreme, for MNEs adopting the global strategy and organisational 
model (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989), foreign subsidiaries will simply replicate their 
headquarters and compete in the local markets on the basis of FSAs transferred in 
from the headquarters. They do not develop additional FSAs adapting to the local 
business environments in host countries, and therefore those foreign subsidiaries lack 
the incentive to access CSAs in host countries. At the other extreme, even for MNEs 
adopting the multi-domestic strategy and organisation (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 2002) will 
focus more strongly on opportunities to access host-country CSAs. But their 
willingness to invest in accessing locally-specific FSAs will still be tempered, both by 
the costs and potential loss of perceived advantage associated with modifying their 
FSAs transferred from home and by the opportunity costs of host-country investment 
at the expense of investing in global or local activities at home. 
 Strategic choices by local firms, by contrast, are largely free of such trade-
offs. Their home market will generally be their clear priority. Moreover, in seeking to 
build competitive advantage local firms will be strongly focused on the advantages of 
those available to them locally (CSAs) and especially those which can potentially 
provide differentiated advantages from those enjoyed by MNEs. These considerations 
lead us to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: Local firms will generally focus more resources on of accessing 




 Absorptive capacity. We may also expect local firms to have different levels 
of absorptive capacity in respect of local CSAs than MNEs. A firm's absorptive 
capacity is largely a function of the firm's level of prior related knowledge (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990). As we have noted above, a number of CSAs can only be accessed 
and exploited by deploying complementary local knowledge about: the local culture 
and business customs of a region; local consumer demands and tastes; expectations 
and behaviour of the local labour force, the strategies and structures of local 
distributors, suppliers and ancillary industries; the operation of local institutions; and 
other factors required for to conduct business in a region (Makino & Delios, 1996). 
Most of this knowledge is experiential and context-dependent (Doz, Santos, & 
Williamson, 2001). It so can only be amassed through the interactions among people 
with the programmes, operations or objects that are specific to a local context, such as 
a work practice in an organization (Yanow, 2004), often over an extended period of 
time. These forms of local knowledge and skills are also both location- and firm-
specific in nature (Rugman & Verbeke, 1992). Because local firms and their staff 
have evolved their knowledge in their local environment (generally since birth), we 
would expect them to have more of this related prior knowledge than MNEs (even 
compared with MNEs with substantial experience in the host country). These 
considerations lead us to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: Local firms will generally have absorptive capacity more suited 
accessing CSAs at home than MNEs because they have amassed more experiential 
and context-dependent local knowledge . 
 
 Government and institutional relationships. As we noted above, government 
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policies may favour local firms over MNEs (Aggarval & Agmon, 1990), placing 
constraints on MNEs ability to access particular types of CSAs in a host country. In 
addition, imperfect markets and non-transparent and un-equal application and 
formulation of government policy may mean that certain CSAs can only be accessed 
in practice if a firm has complementary knowledge and relationships built up over a 
period of time. Likewise relationships may be essential to overcome institutional 
voids that must be bridged in order to access other local CSAs. These barriers are 
especially significant in emerging markets that are often characterised by highly 
imperfect markets, an inefficient judiciary, unpredictable and burdensome regulations, 
heavy bureaucracy, political instability or discontinuity in government policies 
(Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998; Khanna & Palepu, 1997). The absence of a well-
established infrastructure, well-developed market mechanisms, and a well-developed 
contracting and intellectual property rights regime creates particular difficulties for 
MNEs from developed countries, which are not experienced in handling such 
conditions (Prahalad & Lieberthal, 1998). MNEs may acquire some of the necessary 
knowledge to access CSAs under these conditions, or accumulate it through long 
experience, but having evolved in this context, local firms will usually better able to 
deal with these institutional and infrastructure weaknesses (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 
2008; Morck, Yeung, & Zhao, 2008). These  considerations lead us to posit that: 
 
Proposition 3: Local firms will generally be capable than MNEs of accessing CSAs 
at home because they are better able to deal with weak institutions and have a closer 
relationship with government. 
Transforming CSAs into unique FSAs 
 Obtaining complementary knowledge. Complementary knowledge obtained 
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from other firms plays important role in transforming CSAs into FSAs, when internal 
development is difficult or time consuming. Acquisitions and alliances are two ways 
that a firm can access resources owned by other firms (Das & Teng, 2000; Eisenhardt 
& Martin, 2000; Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 2001). External sourcing 
modes such as acquisitions and alliances provide opportunities for obtaining distant 
resources and undertaking path-breaking change (Dussauge, Garrette, & Mitchell, 
2000; Karim & Mitchell, 2000; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001). 
 Acquisitions allow firms to extract value from under-utilised resources that 
firms possess, either through more efficient use of existing resources or through the 
creation of new resources (Karim & Mitchell, 2000). By merging, firms may pool 
similar resources for greater efficiency, so long as increased economies of scale 
outweigh the governance costs of acquisitions. In addition, acquisitions may allow 
firms to combine the routines that underlie different types of resources in order to 
create valuable new resources, again including government costs.  
 Alliances can help firms to gain market power (Hagedoorn, 1993), and move 
more quickly into new markets and technologies (Kogut, 1991). Alliances among 
businesses that possess complementary resources are often necessary for survival and 
growth, and provide a means of combining resources in order to exploit new business 
opportunities. Alliances appear to be an effective way of combining resources that are 
subject to a high degree of knowledge-based market failure (Gulati, 1998; Karim & 
Mitchell, 2000; Mitchell & Singh, 1993, 1996). Moreover, alliances provide a means 
for firms to protect the value of their resources through financial and organisational 
safeguards against opportunistic behaviour (Bresser, 1988; Hennart, 1988; Jorde & 
Teece, 1990; Kogut, 1988; Teece, 1986; Williamson, 1991).  
 There is a surge of outward FDI from emerging economies. By 2006, the 
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outward FDI stock of emerging economies exceeded $1,600 billion, compared to 
$149 billion in 1990 (UNCTAD, 2007). Many local firms' overseas expansion is 
"resource seeking", to learn and leverage resources and knowledge obtained from 
abroad (Bruche, 2009; Mathews, 2002). Local firms have also formed close alliances 
with leading MNEs to obtain complementary knowledge.  
 We need to emphasise that even after obtaining complementary knowledge, 
local firms often still do not possess better knowledge in general than MNEs. After all, 
the latter still have the most sophisticated technologies and proprietary knowledge. 
However, local firms often obtain more knowledge complementary to local strategic 
CSAs so that they are more capable of turning strategic CSAs accessed at home into 
unique FSAs. This is because local firms have more incentives to obtain related 
complementary knowledge to develop specific products and processes meeting the 
needs of local customers. While for MNEs, however, knowledge complementary to 
local strategic CSAs in host countries often does not fit with the knowledge 
transferred from their home countries, and therefore MNEs have less incentives to 
acquire locally complementary knowledge. This analysis leads us to posit that: 
 
Proposition 4: Local firms are more capable than MNEs of transforming strategic 
CSAs accessed at home into non-traditional FSAs because they have obtained more 
complementary knowledge both abroad and domestically. 
 
 Locally-appropriate innovation efforts. The ability of firms to transform local 
CSAs into new FSAs is also strongly influenced by local innovation efforts. There is a 
rich supply of literature on the development and innovation process (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; Kim, 1998; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Schumpeter, 1934; Szulanski, 
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1996; Teece, 2007; Teece & Pisano, 1994). As a starting point, firms often need to 
assimilate complementary knowledge. Assimilation here refers to the firm’s routines 
and processes that allow it to analyse, process, interpret, and understand the 
information obtained from external sources (Kim, 1998; Szulanski, 1996). Secondly, 
firms apply the assimilated complementary knowledge to the end products or services. 
Schumpeter (1934: 65-66) argued that, in general, innovations are new combinations 
of existing knowledge and incremental learning. The introduction of new products or 
processes - does not only mean pushing the frontiers of knowledge; rather, innovation 
can combinative and just new to the user. Promoting new uses of an existing 
technology by adapting it to serve local needs is often an innovation in itself 
(UNCTAD, 2005). For developing countries in particular, innovation is often aimed at 
creating locally appropriate technologies. 
 MNEs may differ strategically from local firms in their innovatory activities. 
Internalization (Buckley & Casson, 1976), or global integration of economic activity, 
reduces the MNE's need for undertaking innovatory activities at their affiliates. The 
largest drawback of internalization lies in the reduction of the deeper learning 
processes and spillovers in the host country. There is likely to be less effort to absorb, 
to adapt, to improve or to innovate technology in affiliates than would be the case 
when local firms obtain external knowledge and build upon the acquired technology 
(UNCTAD, 1999). On the whole, the literature suggests that major strategic decisions 
with regard to innovation are not usually delegated to the subsidiaries (Birkinshaw & 
Morrison, 1996; Birkinshaw, Morrison, & Hulland, 1995). Birkingshaw and Morrison 
(1996) found that there was a risk in having a product innovation mandate in the 
subsidiary, because it may be at variance with the corporate (parent) strategy. 
 For most established MNEs, the core R&D divisions are still located in their 
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home countries. Sometimes MNEs may invest heavily in R&D in emerging markets. 
However, often a large percentage of this investment exploits poorly paid scientists 
and engineers and develops products or services for the international market instead 
of targeting the specific needs of local customers in emerging markets. Conversely, 
local firms in emerging markets invest heavily in R&D to develop specific products 
and services which meet the distinct needs of local customers. They even overcome 
their latecomer disadvantage via a series of risk-taking measures by aggressively 
acquiring or buying critical R&D assets from mature MNEs to compensate for their 
competitive weaknesses (Luo & Tung, 2007). In other words, local firms focus more 
on locally appropriate innovation efforts than MNEs. This reasoning leads us to the 
following proposition: 
 
Proposition 5: Local firms are more capable than MNEs of transforming strategic 
CSAs accessed at home into non-traditional FSAs because they focus more on locally 
appropriate innovation efforts. 
 
 Achieving incentive alignment. Agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976; Keeley, 1980) has long emphasised that the separation of 
ownership from control creates problems with alignment of interests, particularly to 
do with management compensation and the allocation of corporate perquisites. Abuse 
of discretion and the use of corporate assets for private purposes can occur without 
appropriate oversight. These issues become more severe as an enterprise 
internationalises and the separation between ownership and management widens 
(Roth, 1996). In the global industry context, three factors are critical in influencing 
goal incongruence and information asymmetries, thereby determining the potential 
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agency problem within the headquarters-foreign subsidiary relationship. The first 
factor is cultural distance, determined by the degree to which there are differences 
between the cultural characteristics common to the headquarters’ market and those of 
the market of the foreign subsidiary (Erez & Earley, 1993). With increased cultural 
distance, complete and accurate information about agents' performance becomes more 
difficult and expensive to attain. The second factor that increases the agency problem 
in the headquarters-foreign subsidiary relationship concerns the strategic and 
operational role of the foreign subsidiary. It is expected that the specialised 
knowledge and managerial discretion associated with foreign subsidiaries results in 
information asymmetries that increase the agency problem in the headquarters-foreign 
subsidiary relationship (Rajagopalan & Finkelstein, 1992). The third factor concerns 
commitment or psychological alignment at the individual level. Foreign subsidiary 
managers' values or identification may vary in the degree to which they are attached 
to a principal problem. As the parent commitment of the foreign subsidiary manager 
decreases, goal conflict between the manager and headquarters will increase. 
 Because of these difficulties arising from the management of subsidiary 
managers, profitability is often used as the key measure by headquarters to evaluate 
their performance. However this kind of governance is not suited to creating 
additional FSAs from the raw material of CSAs in the host country, as subsidiary 
managers are under huge pressure to achieve short term profitability. For example, 
subsidiary managers would rather invest in marketing and sales divisions (such as 
hiring more sales personnel) which have immediate positive effects on profitability 
than the R&D facilities and capability (which is critical in transforming local CSAs 
into new FSAs) which can have negative short term effect on profitability.  
 In contrast, local firms do not have the agency problem in the headquarters-
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foreign subsidiary relationship. The owners of some local firms are still working as 
the CEOs. Therefore these local firms will be better positioned to achieve incentive 
alignment between owners and managers, and therefore more likely to invest in local 
R&D and other long term investment (such as building accommodation and offering it 
to their employees at low cost) to achieve long term goals, which helps local firms to 
transform raw CSAs into new FSAs. Also, with the development of capital markets in 
developing countries, many local firms are listed firms which are now closely 
monitored by the public. They also have established effective practices of corporate 
governance such as offering stock options to their key employees to achieve incentive 
alignment (which MNEs find difficult to match) and inviting independent board 
members from outside to monitor the performance of senior executives. This analysis 
leads to the following hypothesis:  
 
Proposition 6: Local firms are more capable than MNEs of transforming strategic 
CSAs accessed at home into non-traditional FSAs because they are better positioned 
to achieve incentive alignment between owners and managers. 
 
 In summary, some local firms are more capable of accessing strategic CSAs at 
home that MNEs find difficult to access, and are also more capable of transforming 
them into unique FSAs. Strategic CSAs in emerging markets include skilled but low-
cost labour, an extensive distribution network, demand by a particular market, and 
close relationship with government. This set of CSAs accessed by local firms is 
different from the set of CSAs accessed by MNEs in their home countries. Because 
CSAs are the origins of FSAs, from the different vector of CSAs accessed at home 
local firms are likely to develop unique and non-traditional FSAs. Examples of those 
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non-traditional FSAs include cost innovation capability, the ability to unlock latent 
demand in low-end segments, optimisation of products and processes for emerging 
markets, the ability to deal with weak institutions and infrastructures, or the ability to 
optimise value chains globally in ways that allow low-cost talent and resources to be 
leveraged effectively in emerging markets.   
 It is worth noting that the results (FSAs) of the conversion process can in turn 
change the nature and content of CSAs. Human resources, which is a factor condition, 
may enhance skills and competitiveness through work experience with employers. 
Knowledge and proprietary technologies developed by firms may spillover to their 
alliances and suppliers, consequently improving the competitiveness of local industry 
clusters. New competitive advantages developed by a firm may pose a threat to its 
competitors and therefore spur them to innovate and upgrade. Indeed, CSAs and FSAs 
coexist in the same ecosystem and it is their dynamic interaction that underpins the 
economic development of a nation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 We have now developed the conversion framework with 6 propositions 
systematically explaining the process of converting CSAs into FSAs. We suggest that 
strategic CSAs in emerging markets can be valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and 
non-substitutable resources that can lead to unique and sustained FSAs. Contrary to 
the implicit assumption of the OLI and internalisation theory, strategic CSAs in 
emerging markets are not equally available to all firms operating in the same location. 
We argue that some local firms in emerging markets are more capable of accessing 
strategic CSAs at home because of their different competitive strategies, better local 
knowledge, and close relationship with the government. Some local firms are also 
more capable of transforming strategic CSAs accessed at home into new FSAs 
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because they have obtained complementary knowledge, focused on locally-
appropriate innovation efforts to produce specific products and services to meet the 
specific needs of local customers, and achieved incentive alignment to facilitate the 
conversion process. On the contrary, established MNEs often do not make enough 
complementary investments in emerging markets to transform local strategic CSAs 
into new FSAs. 
 Our research findings have a number of important theoretical contributions. In 
the first instance, we argue that CSAs are not equally available to all firms and local 
firms are able to access CSAs better than MNEs, which is a significant departure from 
the view that CSAs are equally available to all firms (Dunning, 1980, 1988; Rugman, 
1980, 1981). Furthermore, the extant literature has not explained why local firms in 
emerging markets are able to access CSAs better than MNEs at home. We argue that 
local firms in emerging markets are more capable of accessing strategic CSAs than 
MNEs because local firms have different competitive strategies, a closer relationship 
with local government, and better local knowledge. 
 Secondly, our research findings also bear on the heated debate about whether 
local firms in emerging markets have developed unique FSAs compared to 
established MNEs (Ramamurti, 2012). On the surface, local firms in emerging 
markets seem to lack the technology, branding and management advantages of 
established MNEs, as they only have “ordinary resources” which traditionally have 
not been considered to be the source of extraordinary rent (Madhok & Keyhani, 2012). 
We suggest that strategic CSAs accessed by local firms are not ordinary resources in 
the sense that some local firms are more likely than MNEs to access strategic CSAs at 
home because of their different competitive strategies; some local firms are more able 
than MNEs to access strategic CSAs at home because they are better able to deal with 
13736 
 
weak institutions and have a closer relationship with government; and some local 
firms are more capable than MNEs of accessing strategic CSAs at home because they 
have better local knowledge. For these reasons, they can underpin the creation of 
unique and non-traditional FSAs compared to established MNEs.  
 Thirdly, we take a first step towards developing testable propositions in an 
endeavour to construct a dynamic theory of converting CSAs into FSAs. Traditionally 
CSAs (Porter, 1990; Shan & Hamilton, 1991) and FSAs (Barney, 1991; Porter, 1985) 
are studied in two separate paths in the literature. Although many scholars have 
indicated that the origins of FSAs are CSAs (Dunning, 1980; Porter, 1991; 
Williamson & Yin, 2009), how CSAs can be converted into FSAs is not well 
understood. The conversion framework developed in our study contributes to a new 
understanding of the underlying processes of converting CSAs into FSAs. We must 
also note that FSAs developed by firms through the conversion processes can in turn 
change the nature and content of CSAs, and their dynamic interaction in the same 
ecosystem underpins the economic development of a nation. 
 Finally, we also contribute to the RBV theory by extending the boundary of 
valuable resources from internal firm resources alone to include external resources. 
The resource-based view of the firm focuses on the value of internal firm resources 
(Wernerfelt, 1984), and has not considered that external resources may also lead to 
sustained competitive advantage (Priem & Butler, 2001). However, a large percentage 
of CSAs in emerging markets are in fact valuable and rare resources because of the 
imperfect factor markets, underdeveloped institutions, and among other reasons. The 
conversion framework therefore extends the RBV theory by suggesting strategic 
CSAs are valuable and rare resources in the context of emerging markets. 
 Our study also has some interesting implications for practitioners. The first 
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implication is that established multinationals should pay more attention to accessing 
CSAs in host countries. However, MNEs face a dilemma of internalizing proprietary 
technologies and accessing local CSAs by cooperating with local firms. On the one 
hand, MNEs often encounter serious difficulties in accessing CSAs such as 
distribution skills and understanding specific customer demands in a host country, a 
process which calls for cooperation with local firms. On the other hand, leading 
multinationals emphasise the protection of proprietary technologies by internalisation, 
which prevents them from forming close strategic alliances with local firms. How to 
balance internalizing proprietary technologies and accessing local CSAs by 
cooperating with local firms is a task which established multinationals must confront 
and is also essential to success in host countries. 
 The second implication is that in some circumstances accessing strategic 
CSAs is even more difficult than accessing technological knowledge. Accessing 
distribution network in a host country is often a challenge and the inability of MNEs 
to do so has often hampered their entry and jeopardised their survival (Hennart, 2009); 
the practice of preferential purchasing, which locks foreign firms out of government 
contracts, may not change as quite as easily (Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997). On the 
other hand, with the globalisation of the world economy, it is now easier for firms 
from emerging markets to access technologies and know-how through new gateways 
opening up in the form of: outsourcing, modularisation, codification of knowledge, 
and creating more open markets for international talent and corporate control 
(Williamson & Yin, 2009).  
 The third implication is that for established MNEs, willingness to invest in 
emerging markets is not sufficient to transform strategic CSAs in emerging markets 
into new FSAs. The investment must be complementary to local strategic CSAs if 
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they are to take advantage of them. However, most MNEs tend to make investments 
that are driven by their existing business models rather than complementary to local 
strategic CSAs. Again, taking the example of R&D investment, many MNEs have 
established large scale R&D centres in emerging markets. However, often the R&D 
centres in emerging markets try to exploit the low-paid skilled engineers and focus on 
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